| DOI LINK: https://doi.org/10.59879/Z9PV5 |
| Paper ID:Z9PV5 |
| Volume:38 |
| Issue:3 |
| Title:Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Pledge Financing in the Electricity Market Environment |
| Abstract:This paper explores the integration of carbon finance, particularly focusing on carbon emission rights pledge financing, as a pivotal instrument in attaining carbon peak targets. This integration is crucial in the context of growth stabilization and structural adjustment. The study identifies key challenges hindering the development of carbon emission rights pledge financing, such as process discrepancies, limited bank engagement, and suboptimal risk management. Addressing these issues, we propose a novel model featuring government intervention. This model employs an evolutionary game approach involving key stakeholders: power companies, carbon emission exchanges, and banks. The objective is to navigate towards a Pareto optimal outcome for the pledging of carbon emission rights. Numerical analyses reveal that appropriate government sanctions can effectively streamline the pledging process. Results show a higher compliance rate from carbon emission exchanges under stringent regulations and increased bank participation under direct government incentives. The study advocates for the establishment of a robust public disclosure mechanism for carbon emission pledge financing and urges the government to enact unified trading regulations. This proposed method not only tackles existing impediments in carbon finance but also significantly contributes to the global pursuit of sustainable development. |
| Keywords:Government participation; Carbon emission rights; Evolutionary game; Pledge financing; Electric power enterprises; Environmental regulation |
| Authors:Zhengsong Zhou, Mingxing Li, Xiaomeng Chi, Hongzheng Sun, Maulid Hussein Bwabo |
| Paper PDF Link: View full PDF |